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THE VOICE 

OF AN 

OPPRESSED PEOPLE 



T. G. MASARYK: 

The problem of small nations 
in the European crisis. 



JAROSI^V F. SMETANKA: 

Dismemberment of Austria. 



T. G. MASARYK: 

Bohemia and the European crisis. 



# 



PUBLISHED BY THE 

Bohemian National Alliance 

3639 West 26th Street 
CHICAGO 



THE UNCONSIDERED MARTYR. 



Much, though not a word too much, has been said of the 
sufferings of Belgium, Poland and Serbia; brave unfortun- 
ate peoples bludgeoned by the warmakers of Berlin. But 
there is another heroic state whose martyrdom, as cruel as 
these, has passed almost unnoticed — Bohemia. 

By this term is meant the Czecho-Slovak nation, includ- 
ing Bohemia proper. Moravia and a slice of northwestern 
Hungary. This nation numbers nearly 10,000,000 mem- 
bers, has a rich and ancient culture, a stirring history and 
an unbreakable love of liberty. It has resisted all the ef- 
forts of the Hapsburgs to Germanize it and remained a 
Slavic state; friendly to France and England as the liberal 
powers of Europe and to Russia as the protector of Slav 
peoples. For this, even before the war, at was held down 
like a newly conquered and hostile province, and since the 
war broke, Bohemian sufferings have been incalculable. 

By the end of the first year of the conflict, two-thirds 
of the Czech publications had been suppressed, and many 
of the editors imprisoned or executed. No musician is al- 
lowed to play the works of the great Bohemian composer, 
Smetana, and no Czech is allowed to circuflire or read the 
writings of Tolstoi or Emerson. The athletic societies have 
been disbanded, Germans have been put in charge of the 
police administration of Bohemian cities, the national lan- 
guage is forbidden on the railways and may not even be 
used in sending telegrams. These measures are enforced 
with savage severity; according to a semi-official paper of 
Vienna, up to December, 1915, there had been 1,045 civil 
executions in Bohemia and Moravia alone. 

The Bohemians have resisted this tyranny in every way 
they could. Forced by their tyrants iato a war against 
their friends, they have deserted at every opportunity. The 
Twenty-eighth regiment went over to the Russians in a 
body, and i.s now fighting gallantly, on the Russian side. 
The Eighth^ Thirtieth, Eighty-eighth and 102d regiments 
made the same move in a little less unanimous fashion. 
Thousands of recalcitrant Bohemian soldiers have been 
executed, and wholesale confiscations have been levied 
against the families of those who have been taken prison- 
ers; yet stil the desertions go on. 

A people so devoted and resourceful can not be destroyed 
and should not*be held in tutelage. When the war ends, 
there should be an independent republic of Bohemia. — Chi- 
cago Daily Journal. «** 




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ROPE" January 25th. 1917 



THE VOICE 

OF AN 

OPPRESSED PEOPLE 



T. G. MASARYK: 

The problem of small nations 
in the European crisis. 



JAROSLAV F. SMETANKA: 

Dismemberment of Austria. 



T. G. MASARYK: 

Bohemia and the European crisis. 



PUBLISHED BY THE 

Bohemian National Alliance 

' 3639 West 26th Street 

CHICAGO 



i^'^ 



^\^ 



u 



tAj,l- 



^^^^ 1'^A 






THE PROBLEM OF SMALL 
NATIONS IN THE 
EUROPEAN CRISIS. 



PROBLEM OF SMALL NATIONS 
IN THE EUROPEAN CRISIS.* 



INTRODUCTORY REMARKS. 

Your Excellencies, My Lords, Eadies and Gentlemen : 

Your kind reception, I am aware of the fact and I rejoice 
at it, is due to the cause which I represent as lecturer at 
this new chair ; I am deeply sensible of the honor conferred 
upon me by London University in asking me to give the 
inaugural lecture of the new school. 

Like the audience I deeply regret the illness which has 
prevented the Prime Minister from presiding to-day; I 
regret it all the more, because I know what interest on many 
occasions he has shown in the welfare of universities and 
other educational establishments. In this case it is very 
significant that the head of the British Cabinet was willing 
to preside at a lecture on the problem of small nations; 
several members of the Cabinet and British Government 
have frequently proclaimed that the idea and aim of this 
European Crisis is the liberation and freedom of the small 
States and Nations. Mr. Asquith's interest in these Slavonic 
studies is a good omen and an anticipation of what I shall 
bring forward in my lecture; I hope it even may be more, 
it may be a firm first step in the practical solution of the 
problem to be discussed. 

In speaking thus, I must not be suspected of confusing 
science with politics; but science is not to be regarded as 
something merely abstract and in the clouds, science means 
methodical and exact thought about everything within the 

* Inaugural Leciurt at the University of London, King's College. 



6 THE PROBLEM OF SMALL NATIONS 

range of human life. No honest man can avoid thinking 
about the War ; science, according to a French thinker who 
was the living autithesis to militarism and even to politics, 
has to foresee, to know beforehand, to anti'cipate the future. 
The man of science does not give up his patriotism ; but that 
patriotism cannot be blind or dumb; it must proclaim what 
he has found to be the truth. The highest aim of science 
is to understand the aims of life and to find the right means 
of realizing these aims. Science, then, however theoretical 
it may be, inevitably exists in order to be carried into prac- 
tice. In a word, true science, both in morals and in politics, 
directs and hardens the will. The will — for it is not enough 
for men to wish and to imagine that we are already exer- 
cising our will — to will in morals and politics presupposes 
clear seeing, understanding and knowledge. This at least 
in my opinion is the aim of our new School of Slavonic 
studies; scientific work of this kind will help this country to 
understand not only the Slavs but also herself. 

I. — It would help us greatly if I could show you a good 
map of the European nations ; but no such map exists. This 
deficiency of ethnological geography is very significant of 
the scientific situation in this branch of sociological studies, 
which during this war and as a direct result of it, has be- 
come so important. Still more significant is the fact, that 
in spite of the war and the steady discussion of the different 
nationalities, you cannot buy a map showing the extent of 
the different nations ; you will find political maps, maps of 
railroads, etc., but no ethnographical ones. Think of it, 
the very question of this war is graphically not represented, 
though day b}^ day for over a year past endless discussions, 
alike in the press and on the public platform, turn upon 
the question of nationality ! Only a few specialists realize 
the situation and give us in their treatises and books a few 
all too scanty ethnographical data. 

So inveterate is the conception of the State as the only 



IN THE EUROPEAN CRISIS. 7 

social entity which counts in the pohtical world. But today 
we are forced to acknowledge the existence of nations and 
we are obliged to make a distinction between states and na- 
tions; and that of course involves a true grasp of the in- 
congruity of political and ethnographical boundaries. An 
Englishman, speaking of his nation, identifies the nation and 
the state. Not so the Serb or the Bohemian, because to his 
/xperience state and nation do not coincide, his nation being 
spread over several states, or sharing a state with other na- 
tions. We Slavs very keenly discriminate the state from the 
nation; but the Englishman will do the same if he uses ex- 
pressions such as "the spirit" or "the culture" of the Ger- 
man and English nations. 

In the Statesman's Yearbook for 19 15 we find in Europe 
twenty-eight states, if we treat Austria-Hungary and Ger- 
many each as a single state; we must count fifty-three 
states if we separate Hungary from Austria and divide Ger- 
many into her twenty-five federal units. 

If we take one of the few better ethnological maps of 
Europe— alas, a German one — we find sixty-two nations or 
nationalities. In other words, in Europe we have more 
than twice as many nations as states, and that means that 
the existing states are nationally mixed, and that states must 
be composed of more than one nation. And that means 
further that there are in Europe far more dependent than 
independent nations ; only seventeen nations are independ- 
ent, or rather possess their own state organizations ; but 
portions even of these independent nations are dependent 
upon other states. In fact, there are only a few states which 
do not contain more than one nation — only seven out of 
the twenty-eight. But if there are seven national states, 
that does not mean that these seven states are formed by 
seven nationalities ; for some states contain the same na- 
tionality, and in other cases the same nationality is divided 
among different states. 

And be it noted at once, these national states (national in 



8 THE PROBLEM OF SMALL NATIONS 

the strict sense of the word) are all small, some of them 
the smallest states. Andorra, Denmark, S. Marino, Liech- 
tenstein, Monaco, Holland, Portugal. The Papal state in 
Rome belongs to a category of its own. 

The middle sized states and still more the large states, 
are all mixed, though they vary in type according to the 
proportion, the numbers and of course the cultural quality 
of the several national units of which they are composed. 

As a rule, one — the ruling — nation is in the majority; 
in different states this majority is differently scaled. But 
we have at least one instance, where the minority tries to 
rule — the Germans in Austria, and side by side with them, 
the Magyars in Hungary. 

Austria-Hungary represents a unique type of the mixed 
or polyglot state — a comparatively high number of different 
smaller and small nations forms a single state. The Bal- 
kan federation, of which so many idealists, and even poli- 
ticians, have dreamt, would of course belong to the same 
type. 

2. — For our present purpose it is not necessary to give 
an elaborate classification of the mixed states; any real 
sociological treatment of the problem requires exact de- 
scription of the national units in each individual state ; only 
then is fruitful comparison possible. 

If we take the states directly involved in the war, we 
find that all of them are mixed, though in varying degree. 
Germany, in addition to her sixty million German inhabi- 
tants, has six other nationalities, two of them in consider- 
able numbers (Poles — Frenchmen) ; the other four, Lusa- 
tians (Sorbians), Danes, Czechs, Lithuanians, only form- 
ing tiny minorities. Austria-Hungary contains ten nation- 
alities; Turkey in Europe, three, and a few fragments of 
other nations in addition (Turks, Greeks, Bulgarians, Ar- 
menians, etc.; Asiatic Turkey is of course extremely 
mixed). Bulgaria is mixed, for there is a large Turkish 



IN THE EUROPEAN CRISIS. . 9 

minority, to say nothing of fragments of Roumanians, etc. 

The states of the Allies also are mixed, but for the most 
part in a different manner. Great Britain has considerable 
remnants of non-English nations, and so has even France 
of races which are not French; even Italy which is often 
proclaimed as an example of a national state, contains a 
few Slav, German and Albanian fragments. Serbia has 
non-Serbian minorities (Bulgarian and Albanian) ; even 
Montenegro, the smallest state, is mixed. 

Russia is ethnologically a imique state. I speak of 
European Russia ; the British Empire of course contains in 
its various trans-oceanic dominions and colonies many more 
nations and fragments of nations and races, but Great Bri- 
tain is in the main English, whereas Continental Russia, 
though the Russians are in an overwhelming majority, con- 
tains many nations, of which several are numerous, and 
moreover nations which possess their own culture and tra- 
ditions.* 

3. — Comparing the national composition of the European 
states, we perceive a striking difference between tlie East 
and the West of Europe. If we bisect Europe by a line 
drawn from the Adriatic to the Baltic and extended up to 
the head of the Gulf of Bothnia, we find in the West nine- 
teen nations; nine are embodied in twelve states (Portugal, 
Spain, France, Italy, Holland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, 
Germany, Great Britain, Belgium, Switzerland), the re- 
mainder are in the main, national splinters.* 

The state-nations in the west are of all magnitudes: a 

* On a special ethnographical map of Russia (Aitoff, Peuples 
et Langues de la Russie, Annales de Geographie, 1906), one can 
enumerate eighty-five nations of some different races, and be- 
sides the author mentions nameless nationalities. 

* Basques, Bretons, Welsh, Irish, Gaels, Romansch, Lapps — 
to be added to the Slavs, Albanians and Germans in Italy. 



lo THE PROBLEM OF SMAEE NATIONS 

few great, some of medium size, and the rest small ones; 
there is a kind of national equilibrium. 

The East of Europe offers quite a different spectacle. 
There we have one great nation — in fact the largest nation 
in Europe, the rest are all smaller and small nations, some 
few possessing independent states of their own. But in 
Eastern Europe — and this applies especially to Russia — we 
have a very great variety of national and racial fragments. 

The East and West differ also in respect of the number 
and size of states. Whereas the West has eighteen states, 
the East has only eight, two belonging partly to the West, 
partly to the East. For the West and East are not divided 
sharply and by a straight line ; Germany and Austria belong 
both to the West and to the East. 

4. — Speaking of the East and West of Europe and say- 
ing that both halves are not sharply cut, we find a peculiar 
ethnological zone in what is often called Central Europe. 
From Trieste — Salonica — Constantinople, up north to Dan- 
zig — Petrograd in a line not straight, but curved in the di- 
rection of Berlin, in whose neighborhood live the Slav Sorbs, 
is a greater number of smaller nations, which were and still 
are under the dominion of Germany, Austria, Turkey and 
Russia. This zone, composed of East Prussia, Austria- 
Hungary, the Balkans and tlie West of Russia, is the real 
and proper centre of national antagonism. Here the ques- 
tion of nationality and the language question are the po- 
litical vis metrix. It was here that the present war broke 
out ; here is tlie quarter from which come continual unrest 
and disburbance for the whole of Europe. This zone is 
the real kernel of tlie so-called Oriental question ; this zone 
supplies the most urgent and clamant cause for remodelling 
the political organisation of Europe. In this zone the 
smaller nations are continually striving and fighting for 
liberty and independence. It is this zone which has con- 
fronted the statesmen of Europe with the problem of Small 



IN THE EUROPEAN CRISIS. n 

Nations ; and it is the Allies more especially whom this war 
is forcing to apply themselves to its solution. 

The nations of this danger-zone have been free, but de- 
prived of their independence ; some are highly cultivated and 
their extent is considerable, they are the greatest among the 
small nations. Finally, it is necessary to emphasize the 
striking fact, that three of these nations are dismembered 
in different states ; the Serbo-Croats are divided into four 
states and seven administrative bodies; the Poles into three 
states ; the Czechs and Slovaks into two states ; this dismem- 
berment explains the special significance of the Serbo-Cro- 
atian, Polish and Bohemian questions. 



II. 

5. — We are always speaking of smaller and greater, of 
small and great nations — what then is the proper definition 
of a small and of a great nation? What makes a nation 
great? What is the problem of a small nation and how does 
such a problem come to exist? 

The very notion of greatness and smallness is relative 
and correlative; the more so, if the number of the popula- 
tion, or the extent of the territory of a state or a nation is 
taken as the principle of the classification. 

The most numerous population is in Russia, Germany 
and Austria-Hungary, and the Russians and Germans are 
in this sense the greatest nations; the English, French, 
Italians and Spaniards (we are not considering the nations 
outside Europe) are smaller. Some sociologists will per- 
haps put the Russians, Germans and English as one class 
(eighty-six — forty-five millions), the French, Italians, and 
Spaniards (forty — twenty millions) in a middle class. A 
third category would be formed by nations under twenty 
millions, say the Poles, Roumanians, Serbo-Croats and 



12 THE PROBI.EM OF SMAEE NATIONS 

Czechs; then would follow the Portuguese, Swedes, etc., 
and finally would come what might be described as the frag- 
ments or splinters of nations. 

I hardly need point out that such a classification is based 
upon mere numbers and their effects ; nor will anyone seek 
to minimize the decisive material value of these mathemat- 
ical calculations. We all know now what a greater or 
smaller army means. 

But the numerical greatness of a nation is variable and 
changing. Since the nineteenth century almost all nations 
have been growing in numbers. All nations then, are get- 
ting larger and statisticians can calculate when the popula- 
tion of the various nations will be doubled. Through this 
process of growth the numerical relation of the different na- 
tions will be changed, owing to the fact that some increase 
more rapidly than others. The most striking instance, and 
one which provides a partial explanation of this war, is 
the slow increase of the population in France compared 
with its quick growth in Germany. Till 1845 France had 
a larger population than Germany; indeed, at the end of 
the eighteenth and at the beginning of the nineteenth cen- 
tury the Frenchmen were practically the largest nation. A 
good deal of the French history of that time can be ex- 
plained by this fact, just as recent German history will be- 
come clear if we consider the numerical increase of the 
population. The Germans themselves boast of this increase 
as one of their claims to greatness. 

We touch here upon the intricate problem of decadence 
and degeneration; the fact that the annual birth-rate in 
many countries or parts of countries has been falling in 
recent years, the fact that changes in the development of 
the birth-rate are experienced very often and often very 
suddenly, tliese facts, I say, force every thinking man to ab- 
stain from general indictments and condemnations. 

The German extreme nationalists have no right to con- 
demn France and other countries in which the increase of 



IN THE EUROPEAN CRISIS. 13 

the population is slower than in Germany. For not merely 
is the birth-rate falling in Germany also, but it should be 
remembered that the overwhelming majority of German 
economists accept in tlieir theory of population the leading 
ideas of Malthus, and are not inclined to see in this pre- 
cipitate augmentation of the population an undoubted proof 
of physical and moral vigour. 

But let us assume for a moment that the increase of the 
population, the surplus of the birth-rate over the death- 
rate, can be applied as a standard to physical and even 
moral health and strength. In that case the population 
principle applies as much to Germany as to other countries. 
Students of the question know that England during the 
nineteenth century is the only instance of a country where 
the population was trebled; and it is equally worth not- 
ing that in the Bohemian countries the Czech population 
increased more rapidly than the German population. Will 
the German ultra-nationalists admit the consequences of 
their own logic in these and other cases ? 

To sum up the argument : Physical greatness and strength, 
being ipso facto always relative and correlative, is no war- 
rant, no foundation of right and of prerogatives; seventy 
is certainly far more than ten, but have the seventy the right 
to deprive the ten of their bread? Have they the right to 
use force? 

6. — The German jingoes appeal to history. History, they 
argue, shows that small states are slowly but surely dis- 
appearing and serving as a material for the big ones. Com- 
pare the hundreds of small states in the Middle Ages and 
even in modern times — they are absorbed and swallowed 
up by the bigger ones; Prussia herself is an instance of 
such absorption, but France, Italy, England also — in a word, 
all big states were formed out of small ones. History then 
proves that the law of political development makes the for- 
mation of great states and nations unavoidable. Small na- 



14 THE PROBLEM OF SMALL NATIONS 

tions and states, under tlie most favourable circumstances, 
have only a temporary duration, historical development 
favours and promotes the growth of big nations and states ; 
Germany is big, bigger than the rest, with one exception, 
which is more apparent than real ; therefore her legitimate 
aim is World- Policy, World-Power ! 

Let us probe to the bottom this Pan-Germanic imper- 
ialist theory. It is quite true, that many hundreds of small 
states — city states — were absorbed by one state growing 
bigger and bigger. But in France, Italy, etc., partly even 
in Prussia, this process was a gathering of the same people, 
of the same nation, not a subduing of foreign nations. 
Though of course Prussia and other states subjugated for- 
eign nations too. 

If history proves that small states and nations are ephe- 
meral, it proves the same of big states — remember the 
Oriental empires, Alexander the Great, the Greeks and Ro- 
mans, the Franks, the old German Empire, Napoleon. All 
these states — not nations — were temporary also. The real 
meaning of these political, un-national formations is mis- 
understood by the pan-Germanists, and the arguments which 
they are based upon are false. 

History is a process of integration, but at the same time 
of disintegration; the double process appears as the 
strengthening of individualism and the simultaneous 
growth of collectivism. History tends not towards uniform- 
ity, but towards variety, towards organized variety, which 
very often is misrepresented as barren, monotonous, in- 
discriminate uniformity. 

Speaking politically, the centralising tendencies in social 
life are steadily counterbalanced by the striving for au- 
tonomy and federation in all its variety; centralized abso- 
lutism is everywhere checked by freedom, the centralising 
tendencies of aristocracy are weakened by the individualis- 
tic tendencies of democracy. This double process pervades 
all departments of social life. 



IN THE EUROPEAN CRISIS. 15 

History then refutes the Pan-German argument. His- 
tory shows that national states develop in Europe. And 
History is in favour not only of big, but also of medium- 
sized and small national states. 

History is in favour of all individuals, of individualism 
in general ; nations are natural organisations of homogene- 
ous individuals, and states being more artificial organisa- 
tions, are more and more adapted to the nations. So gen- 
eral is this tendency that the numerical strength of the na- 
tions does not play a decisive part. 

History shows that since the eighteenth century the prin- 
ciple of Nationality has grown stronger, and received more 
and more political recognition. National individualities, 
their language and culture have steadily gained ground all 
over Europe, and linguistic rights have been gradually codi- 
fied. These rights have been and still are advocated by 
Italy, by the Austro-Hungarian and Balkan nations; they 
are advocated by Germany herself. How then can Ger- 
many or any other nation claim for herself this right and 
at the same time refuse it to others. 

How strong and how far-reaching national feeling and 
ideas have becom.e in modern times, is proved by the re- 
vival of oppressed nationalities in all states. The Renais- 
sance of the Bohemian nation is a specially striking in- 
stance, and a confirmation of the general national principle. 
The social unit of conscious nations, breaking the all-com- 
prising social unit, the old state being the organ of po- 
litical and military conquest. The function of the state 
changed, therefore, and changed in accordance with the de- 
velopment of culture. Austria and Prussia are classical 
instances of the antagonism of state and nationality. The 
state is autocratic, ruling and domineering, the nation is 
democratic, administering, social, developing from within. 
The states therefore are adapted to the nations. 

History farther shows that the strengthening of national 
feeling does not prevent the growth of internationalism and 



i6 THE PROBLEM OF SMAEE NATIONS 

internationalisation. I am not playing with words when I 
draw a sharp distinction between inter-nationalism and 
inter-^^a^wm. (I hope that philologists will pardon the 
word.) True nationalism is not opposed to international- 
ism, but we abhor those nationalist jingoes who in the name 
of nationalism oppress other nations, and we reject that 
form of internationalism and cosmopolitanism, which in 
fact recognizes only one — its own nation — and oppresses 
the others. True internationalism is not oppression, but 
neither is it a-nationalism nor anti-nationalism. 

We learn from history that the warlike spirit tends to 
diminish, that militarism is getting more and more defen- 
sive after having been offensive; we learn from history 
that peoples and nations are more and more ready to work 
for themselves, without depending on the labour of others. 
Idleness, the oppressive form of aristocracy, whether in 
individuals, in classes, in nations and in races, is diminish- 
ing. History finally shows that brute force and quantity 
is less and less esteemed. In all nations the best men are 
agreed in prizing spiritual and moral forces; humanity is 
the effective watchword of the champions of all nations. 

It is true, and history confirms it, that mankind strives 
for unity, but it does not strive for uniformity: World- 
federation, not world-power. Consensus gentium — not slav- 
ery of nations and races; the Organisation — not the Con- 
quest of Europe. 

If I am not mistaken, this war is a revelation of this 
historic truth. No Herrenvolk, but national equality and 
parity : Liberie, Bgalite, Fraternitd among nations as among 
individuals. These political principles, proclaimed in 
France in the name of humanity, are the foundation of 
democracy within the single nations, and they are the foun- 
dation of democratic relations between states and nations, 
of democratic internationalism. 

The Pan-Germans appeal in 'vain to history; the facts 
are against them. History most assuredly is vitae magis- 



IN THE EUROPEAN CRISIS. 17 

tra, the teacher for life; but there is history and history. 
In fact, history does not prove anything, for all facts are 
equally historical — history gives us many examples of bru- 
tality as of humanity, of truth as of falsehood. The Huns 
also are historical. The real question has always been, and 
always will be, whether we are to bow unquestioningly be- 
fore all historical facts, or whether we are resolved to mas- 
ter them. I am an adherent of realism; but the spiritual 
and moral forces in society and their growth are not less 
real than the Prussian generals; we can and must accept 
political realism, but we never can approve of the Real- 
politik of Treitschke, Mommsen, Lagarde, Bernhardi, etc., 
who have converted anthropology into zoology. I say that, 
though I am speaking in the country of Darwin and his 
theory of the so-called fittest. 



III. 

7. — Smaller and Small National States could exist very 
well ; in fact, they do exist — out of the twenty-eight states 
at the very most seven can be classified as great or greater ; 
in other words, the small states outnumber the great by 
three to one. On a basis of mere size then we are not sur- 
prised to hear that there is only one great state, only one 
great nation entitled to world-power. 

The conditions of political independence for smaller 
states are the same as for the bigger ones. Small and big 
states have the same natural frontiers: mountain-chains 
(the Pyrenees — the Bohemian mountains), great rivers, etc. 
The big and almost all small states are on the sea; only 
Switzerland and Serbia are land-locked, but then it is just 
Switzerland which provides eloquent proof that a small 
state can flourish without a coast line. Many of the smaller 
nations (Czechs, Magyars, etc.) are without the sea. 



i8 THE PROBLEM OF SMAEL NATIONS 

On the whole, the so-called national frontiers are po- 
litical, they were chosen by the states for strategical rea- 
sons. The nations spread regardless of natural frontiers ; 
these frontiers are losing more and more their political im- 
portance, for culture and the progress of culture means 
the control and mastery of nature and her blind forces. 

States and nations, even when small, have been able to 
protect their independence; take, for instance, small Mon- 
tenegro and the other Balkan nations against Turkey, Hol- 
land against Spain, Switzerland (in its smaller size) against 
Austria^ etc. The biggest states have been unable to resist 
small but determined nations, whose spirit is expressed in 
the famous words of the Bohemian patriot, Dr. Rieger: 
"We won't give in !" 

The physical, mental and moral qualities of smaller na- 
tions are just as good as those of their greater neighbours 
and oppressors. Are the Serbians less brave than the Aus- 
trian-Germans ? the Czechs less energetic and strenuous for 
having conserved and strengthened their nationality against 
the Germans? Denmark is probably the most cultured 
country in Europe, Bohemia has fewer ilhterates than the 
Austrian-Germans. 

Such instances could easily be multiplied ; but I am ready 
to concede that on the other hand small nations labour un- 
der certain disadvantages. A small nation has a more 
limited number of hands and heads: the division and or- 
ganisation of labour, physical and mental, is less adequate. 
There is a smaller number of specialists, wealth and com- 
fort are more restricted. But here, too, there are excep- 
tions : take Holland, Switzerland, Bohemia, etc. Some 
small nations are apt to acquire a peculiar form of timidity, 
a lack of daring and enterprise; occasionally even a kind 
of cringing want of frankness. But are these qualities not 
due to the effect of prolonged oppression? To be sure, 
these and other drawbacks, in so far as they exist, exist 
only under given circumstances, under the pressure of the 



IN THE EUROPEAN CRISIS. 19 

existing system of rapacious militarism and economic ex- 
ploitation. Eet the smaller nations be free, do not inter- 
fere, leave them alone, and these drawbacks will soon dis- 
appear. 

But small nations have also some advantages over great- 
er nations ; both drawbacks and advantages are relative. 

A smaller nation develops a certain many-sidedness ; 
every individual force and talent is valued and used, labour 
and effort and indeed the whole working system are inten- 
sified. It is a well known fact that the lands of small farm- 
ers produce relatively much more than do large estates. The 
whole nation is, so to speak, well-kneaded. Palacky, our 
great Bohemian historian, exhorted his nation to treble and 
even to increase ten-fold its labours ; small nations are in- 
deed nations of workers. In a smaller community there is 
a more intensive inter-communion of men, ideas and feel- 
ings ; people know each other, they can more easily be uni- 
ted, though of course this intimacy also has its drawbacks. 
Dr. Fisher, the Vice-Chancellor of Sheffield University, in 
his essay on the value of small states, brings out the fact 
that democracy, the direct participation of the people in the 
government, can be better developed in small states. He 
adduces many instances ; and it was certainly this idea that 
inspired Rousseau's proposal to divide the big states into 
small communities. Sociologists and historians know that 
the administrative machinery of the modern state grew out 
of the small administration of cities. The great cities hi 
big states are a remedy against indefinite expansion, I 
will not conceal the fact tliat small nations also can be de- 
coyed by tempting imperialist ideals; notable instances are 
the Magyars, and perhaps the Bulgarians. The poet Kol- 
lar, the great apostle of hutaanity and national reciprocity, 
rightly observed that small nations can be very intolerant. 

The German Imperialists often tell us that small nations 
cannot produce great men ; great men require, we are told, 
a great environment, the communion of many and great 



20 THE PROBLEM OF SMAEE NATIONS 

spirits. I do not believe it, and I take the instance of my 
own country; the whole world knows and esteems John 
Huss; the whole world has learnt from the educationalist 
Comenius ; the religious community of the United Brethren 
is a marvel of history, as historians say; the founder of 
this church, Peter Chelcicky, the great predecessor of Tol- 
stoi, is more and more appreciated ; our nation was the first 
to break the spiritual centralisation of the middle ages, and 
to dare the Reformation, Zizka, the leader of the Hus- 
sites, is the founder of modern strategy. 

The bravery and the heroism of small nations has been 
mentioned; Hussite Bohemia faced the whole of Central 
Europe ; historians report that the Germans fled on hearing 
the Hussite battlesong, (Would that the Allies could com- 
pose a similar song!) But whatever shortcomings or even 
faults small nations may have, they love their country and 
their people, and this love prompts them to energetic ac- 
tion in the field of politics and culture. 

I speak of culture. That is a difficult and intricate so- 
ciological factor. I will only express my point of view. 
Culture is not the product of any one nation, big or small ; 
there are various types and different degrees of culture. 
I am no blind follower of Rousseau or mere admirer of 
the primitive stages of culture, but it is a very great dis- 
ability not to accept the various forms and degrees of cul- 
ture as represented by the many nations and parts of na- 
tions, and not to understand that each nation must work out 
its culture alone and independently, and not simply take 
that of another nation, even if it be called a higher culture. 
Passive acceptance of this kind may be convenient, but it is 
dangerous and detrimental. 

Culture cannot be knocked and drubbed into nations. If 
the Germans speak of their being supporters of civilisation 
— "Kulturtrager" — it is only a pretext, A Polish politician 
is absolutely right in denouncing forced denationalisation 
as one of the great social evils. 



IN THE EUROPEAN CRISIS. 21 

Dr. Fisher, speaking of the rude and vaHant Serbian 
peasant, very aptly alludes to the ballads which sing of 
the battle of Kosovo, and to their great educational influ- 
ence on the Southern Slavs. During the last war against 
the Turks I happened to be in Serbia, and a Serbian officer 
told me his experience on the battlefield. When at the 
head of his regiment of peasant soldiers he reached the plain 
of Kosovo, the famous "Field of the Blackbirds," a death- 
like silence seized the whole detachment; men and officers, 
without any command, uncovered their heads, crossed them- 
selves, and each of them tried to tread softly, so as not to 
disturb the eternal sleep of their heroic ancestors. (Here 
.my friend, quite lost in the remembrance of that great ex- 
perience, unconsciously imitated their gait, and his voice 
fell to a whisper as he recalled the silence of his soldiers.) 
Many of the weather-beaten faces were bedewed with un- 
conscious tears, as was my friend's face while he spoke. I, 
too, was deeply affected by the recital of his experience. 
How many of the German professors, who today are rav- 
ing against Serbia, do you think are worth one tear of these 
illiterate peasants? 

If time permitted, I might analyze the drawbacks of 
great nations. Germany herself, who claims to be the great- 
est of all, is tormented by a perpetual unrest. Greatness 
imposes a duty — to protect the smaller brothers and at 
least to help them to join and organize their federations. 
The Balkan peoples tried it, but no help came to them from 
Europe. In all nations the need of social reform is recog- 
nised; the weak are to be protected by the strong and by 
the state. An analogous principles holds good in the rela- 
tion of big to small states and nations. As there is no Su- 
per-man, so there is no Super-right of great nations. The 
great nation has no right to use its smaller neighbours as 
the tools of imperialistic fancy and of an inordinate crav- 
ing for power. On the other hand, the small nations must 



22 THE PROBLEM OF SMALI^ NATIONS 

not try to imitate tlie great; they must be satisfied to go 
their own way. 

8. — Pleading for the independence of small nations, I 
am not ignorant of the sophistical objections masquerading 
as arguments, that the Lapps cannot form a state and the 
Kalmucks cannot have a university. The question is, 
whether nations, conscious of their nationality, and prov- 
ing the possibility of political independence by their econ- 
omic and cultural progress, and by their claims and efforts 
for liberty, can be independent. Take, e. g., the Poles, 
Serbo-Croats and Czechs; these nations are the biggest of 
the smaller nations (twenty to ten millions), they have 
been independent, they reached a high degree of culture, 
they strive and even fight for liberty, for they are thor- 
oughly conscious of their nationality and are determined 
not to abandon their historical and national rights. 

It is a matter of course that there are different degrees 
and forms of independence. Sovereignty is relative, for 
the economic and cultural interdependency of all nations is 
growing. Even the greatest states are dependent on other 
states ; the Triple Alliance and Triple Entente are the very 
proof of it. Europe is getting more and more federalised 
and organized. And it is in this given situation and de- 
velopment that the small nations reclaim the right of being 
peaceably inserted in the growing organisation of Europe. 
The degree and the form of independence — autonomy with- 
in a state — federation — suzerainty — personal unity, etc.), 
in every individual case will easily be found and formula- 
ted according to constitutional rules and laws, when once 
the principle has been acknowledged. 

9. — Great Britain came into this war to protect little Bel- 
gium, and now with her allies she is faced by the task of 
protecting Serbia. This evolution of the war is almost log- 
ical, for Germany's aim is and was Berlin — Bagdad — the 



IN THE EUROPEAN CRISIS. 23 

employment of the nations of Austria-Hungary as helpless 
instruments, and the subjection of the smaller nations which 
form that peculiar zone between the West and East of Eur- 
ope. Poland, Bohemia, Serbo-Croatia (the South Slavs), 
are the natural adversaries of Germany, of her Drang nach 
Osten; to liberate and strengthen these smaller nations is 
the only real check upon Prussia. Free Poland, Bohemia, 
and Serbo-Croatia would be so-called buffer states, their 
organisation would facilitate and promote the formation of 
a Magyar state, of Greater Roumania, of Bulgaria, Greece 
and the rest of the smaller nations. If this horrible war, 
with its countless victims, has any meaning, it can only be 
found in the liberation of the small nations who are men- 
aced by Germany's eagerness for conquest and her thirst 
for the dominion of Asia. The Oriental question is to be 
solved on the Rhine, Moldau and Vistula, not only on the 
Danube, Vardar or Maritza. 

Great Britain protecting the liberty of Belgium was led 
by tlie right feeling of justice; all nations, especially the 
unfree, appreciated the noble decision of the English na- 
tion ; the fact that Great Britain in protecting Belgium pro- 
tects herself and Asia, does not impair her merit. Justice 
is not only noblfe, it is quite sensible and useful too. 

I will conclude with a confession. I prepared this lec- 
ture at the very moment when Serbia was about to be at- 
tacked by Germany and her baggage-porters, Austria-Hun- 
gary and Bulgaria. But more than once 'the sceptical 
thought has struck me: is this the time for talking about 
small nations, when the vital thing is simply to afford pro- 
tection to one of them? Feeling this incongruity, I will 
comfort myself with the saying of a Slav thinker : "A good 
word is a deed also." I can at least promise that all the 
lecturers at the new school of Slavonic Studies will spare 
no effort to make it a success and through it to contribute, 
however imperfectly, to drawing closer the relations be- 
tween Britain and the Slavonic world. 



DISMEMBERMENT 
OF AUSTRIA. 



26 THE PROBLEM OF SMALL NATIONS 



DISMEMBERMENT OF AUSTRIA. 

The foundations for the present Austrian empire were 
laid in 1526, when Ferdinand, to whom his elder brother 
Charles conveyed the Hapsburg dominions on the Danube 
and in the Alps, secured his election to the thrones of Bo- 
hemia and Hungary made vacant by the death of his bro- 
ther-in-law Louis. Austria-Hungary of today contains in 
addition to these three elements only the Polish-Ruthenian 
provinces of Galicia and Bukovina on the northeast and 
smaller districts inhabited by Italians and Croatians on the 
southwest. The two Turkish provinces of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, annexed recently, are purely Serbo-Croat in 
race and language. 

Out of this brief statement of the origin and growth of 
the Hapsburg empire one fact stands out clearly, namely, 
that this great power, second in area and third in popula- 
tion among the states of Europe, is not the product of the 
expansion of a single race occupying constantly new lands 
and assimilating new people. The races that the Hapsburgs 
gathered under their sway are still in existence, full of 
energy, conscious of their separate nationality, eager to 
live their own life, fighting bitterly all attempts to make 
them over into something else, whether it be into Germans 
or Magyars. The dynasty could have justified and made 
possible the continued existence of this collection of na- 
tions and fragments of nations only if it had allowed each 
race full opportunity for self -development and widest pos- 
sible measure of autonomy. But the dynasty was German. 
Up to 1866 its ambition was to be the head of the entire 
German nation, of which the Hapsburg territories were to 
form an integral part. When the Prussian kings supplanted 
the rulers of Austria in the leadership of Germany, Francis 



IN THE EUROPEAN CRISIS. 27 

Joseph hesitated for a while and was on the verge of mak- 
ing his empire a federal structure with equal rights for all 
races, but instead of that he put into effect a compromise 
by means of which he pacified the Magyars and sacrificed 
all the rest. He divided his empire into two parts. In the 
Austrian half of it the German minority was made the rul- 
ing race, while the Hungarian half with its Slav and Ruman 
majority, was turned over to the Magyars. 

A few figures will show the galling injustice of this ar- 
rangement. But before Austrian official statistics are cited, 
it is necessary to mention that they are notoriously biased 
in favor of the two ruling races. In 1910 the racial figures 
for the Austrian half of the monarchy were as follows: 

Germans 9,950,266 

Bohemians 6,435,983 

Poles 4,967,984 

Little Russians 3,608,844 

Slovenians 1,252,940 

Serbo-Croatians 783,334 

Italians 768,422 

Roumanians 275,115 

The German population, which numbers only 35.58 per 
cent, has a majority in parliament and treats the Slavs, who 
number more than 60 per cent, as "minderwertig", inferior 
people. 

In Hungary the Slavs and the Roumanians fared even 
worse, for the Magyars, an Asiatic race, proceeded ruth- 
lessly to make the world Magyar and Hungarian synony- 
mous. Everything non-Magyar was treason against the 
Hungarian state, and races that lived in Hungary, when 
the Magyars were still an unknown tribe wandering on the 
steppes of Central Asia, were condemned to extinction. 
This barbarous policy did bring results, for in 1910 the 
Magyars, according to their statistics, for the first time 
formed a bare majority of the people of Hungary. The 
figures for 1910 are as follows: 



28 THE PROBLEM OF SMALL NATIONS 

Magyars 10,050,575 

Roumanians 2,949,027 

Germans 2,037,435 

Slovaks 1,967,970 

Croatians 1,833,167 

Serbians 1,106,471 

Little Russians 472,587 

The policy of oppression pursued by the two ruUng races 
of the dual empire made the collapse of the whole crazy 
structure of the Hapsburg monarchy inevitable sooner or 
laiter. For years, as Francis Joseph was growing old, spec- 
ulation was rife about the fate of Austria after his death. 
As it is, Francis Joseph preceded his empire into the tomb 
by only a year or so. When he declared war on Serbia, he 
signed the death warrant of the greatness of the Hapsburg 
dynasty. 

Today not a single one of the eleven races subject to 
Emperor Charles desires tlie continuation of Austria-Hun- 
gary. Poles expect the restoration of Poland; Little Rus- 
sians want to join twenty-five million of their kinsmen in 
Russia; Roumanians hope to form a part of greater Rou- 
mania; Croatians, Slovenians and Serbians plan the union 
of their race with Serbia and Montenegro in a Great Yugo- 
slav kingdom. Italians of Austria will naturally be joined 
to Italy. Bohemians and Slovaks want independence in a 
common Czechoslovak state. Magyars care for only one 
thing, to maintain their tyranny over all Hungary, while 
the Germans want the closest union with or even annexa- 
tion to imperial Germany. The only Austrian left is the 
emperor. Dismemberment of Austria will hurt Emperor 
Charles in pride and pocket, but it will be welcomed by 
the overwhelming majority of the people of the empire. 

During the nineteenth century the Turk was the sick man 
of Europe. Today that ignoble role is played by Austria. 
The sooner it is partitioned in accordance with the legiti- 
mate aspirations of its races, the better for the peace of the 
world. 



BOHEMIA AND THE 
EUROPEAN CRISIS. 



IN THE EUROPEAN CRISIS. 31 



BOHEMIA AND THE EUROPEAN CRISIS. 

The Allies' political programme formulated in the Note 
to President Wilson demands the liberation of the Czechs 
and Slovaks from foreign domination, as well as that of the 
Italians, Southern Slavs and Roumanians. Italy, Serbia, 
Roumania are fighting as part of the great alliance against 
the Central Powers. Can the Czechs and Slovaks, as parts 
of Austria-Hungary, be treated on the same terms? It is 
just the inclusion of this point in their political programme 
which proves that the Allies have grasped the European 
situation; that they perfectly understand the part which 
Pan-germanism plays in the war, and that they are aware 
of the significance of Austria-Hungary for Germany, and, 
therefore, for Bohemia and Slovakia. 

Bohemia is a part of Austria-Hungary, but, nevertheless, 
the Czecho-Slovaks are working and even fighting for and 
with the Allies. The peculiar passive revolution of Bohe- 
mia is now known to the whole world, though the Austro- 
Hungarian and German Censors for a long time succeeded 
in suppressing the facts and in spreading false news about 
the unity and loyalty of all the Austro-Hungarian nations. 
Europe now knows what it means when all the leading pol- 
iticians and writers of Bohemia, and thousands of men and 
women of all classes, are imprisoned, and many even sen- 
tenced to death; when all independent newspapers are sup- 
pressed, when the property of thousands is confiscated, 
when the Czech regiments refuse to fight, and surrender 
whenever opportunity offers. And Europe, I hope, alsp 
realizes the awful moral situation of a nation which wholly 
sympathizes with the Allies, but whose sons, by the mere 
mechanical organization of militarism, are forced to fight 



34 THE PROBLEM OF SMALL NATIONS 

hemia even became Electors of the Holy Roman Empire, 
and the Luxemburg dynasty (Charles IV. and his son, 
Wenceslaus) succeeded in being elected Emperors. In the 
thirteenth century Bohemia began to push southwards, and 
Premysl Otokar II. (1253-78) incorporated the Austrian 
duchies into his kingdom. Rudolf of Habsburg defeated 
Ottokar, strengthened Austria, and not only became Em- 
peror himself, but laid the foundations of the Habsburg 
dynasty. Yet Bohemian imperialism was not checked by 
Rudolf ; under the Luxemburg dynasty Lusatia and Silesia 
were acquired, and even the Margravate of Brandenburg 
was, for a time, joined to Bohemia. 

Bohemia was quite independent, though German histor- 
ians often treat it as part of Germany. The king was sov- 
ereign in his State, but received investiture from the Em- 
peror. In earlier times the princes of Bohemia paid a small 
tribute to the Emperor, and the church of Bohemia was 
dependent upon the Archbishop of Regensburg, until, in 
973 the Bishopric of Prague (1344 Archbishopric) was 
founded. Though much smaller than Germany, Bohemia, 
having her power centralized and being well-administered, 
succeeded in maintaining complete independence against the 
temporal pretensions of the Empire. 

Though the mediaeval Empire did not rest upon a national 
principle, it nevertheless oppressed the non-German peoples 
and Germanised them, ruler and State being alike German. 
The Church supported and aided Germanisation, though 
Latin, her own peculiar language, was also the language of 
the administration and diplomacy. The Kings of Bohemia 
acquired German lands and imported German colonists, 
whose devotion they secured by the grant of special privi- 
leges. Germany was dangerous by reason of her numbers, 
and sometimes her culture; but Bohemia was able to resist 
because she knew how to use her forces, and because she 
had a culture of her own, which was not inferior to the 
German. Yet it must be conceded that the Bohemian Court 



IN THE EUROPEAN CRISIS. 35 

and aristocracy adopted German customs and even the Ger- 
man language. 

2. From the fourteenth century Bohemia has really, 
played a decisive role in European history ; from her came 
the great reforming movement which has stirred up the 
world. The period during which the new Luxemburg dy- 
nasty linked Bohemia to the Empire and the French West 
coincided with a Czech literary revival which repudiated 
the influx of unwonted luxury and refinement, and was 
brought home to the masses of the nation by able preachers. 
The University of Prague, founded by Charles IV. in 1349, 
became the centre of culture for Bohemia and her neigh- 
bours. John Hus and his noble friend, Jerome of Prague, 
became the great torchbearers of the Reformation. Their 
death inflamed the whole Bohemian nation against Rome 
and the treacherous Emperor Sigismund. 

The Hussite Reformation of Bohemia was the inaugura- 
tion of modern spiritual life. Hus opposed the individual 
conscience and the Bible to the authority of the Church 
and of Rome, and thus became the forerunner of the Refor- 
mation : but his true significance lies in his moral teaching 
and death. There were many heretics before Hus; but 
Hus involved the whole Bohemian nation in his heresy, and 
as Rome, making use of Germany, tried to crush Bohemia 
by means of crusades, the Hussite war is a landmark in 
European thought. Bohemia held not only Germany but 
the whole of Europe at bay, and Ziska, the leader of the 
victorious Hussites, became the inventor of modern strat- 
egy. 

The Hussite Reformation was essentially one of life and 
of morals. The Hussites became anti-clerical ; and even 
today clericalism in Bohemia is considered the enemy of 
true religion. Being conservative in its theological teach- 
ing and radical in its moral endeavor, Hussitism soon 
became radical in its teaching also. The Taborites had al- 



34 THE PROBLEM OF SMALL NATIONS 

hernia even became Electors of the Holy Roman Empire, 
and the Luxemburg dynasty (Charles IV. and his son, 
Wenceslaus) succeeded in being elected Emperors. In the 
thirteenth century Bohemia began to push southwards, and 
Premysl Otokar II. (1253-78) incorporated the Austrian 
duchies into his kingdom. Rudolf of Habsburg defeated 
Ottokar, strengthened Austria, and not only became Em- 
peror himself, but laid the foundations of the Habsburg 
dynasty. Yet Bohemian imperialism was not checked by 
Rudolf; under the Luxemburg dynasty Lusatia and Silesia 
were acquired, and even the Margravate of Brandenburg 
was, for a time, joined to Bohemia. 

Bohemia was quite independent, though German histor- 
ians often treat it as part of Germany. The king was sov- 
ereign in his State, but received investiture from the Em- 
peror. In earlier times the princes of Bohemia paid a small 
tribute to the Emperor, and the church of Bohemia was 
dependent upon the Archbishop of Regensburg, until, in 
973 the Bishopric of Prague (1344 Archbishopric) was 
founded. Though much smaller than Germany, Bohemia, 
having her power centralized and being well-administered, 
succeeded in maintaining complete independence against the 
temporal pretensions of the Empire. 

Though the mediaeval Empire did not rest upon a national 
principle, it nevertheless oppressed the non-German peoples 
and Germanised them, ruler and State being alike German. 
The Church supported and aided Germanisation, though 
Latin, her own peculiar language, was also the language of 
the administration and diplomacy. The Kings of Bohemia 
acquired German lands and imported German colonists, 
whose devotion they secured by the grant of special privi- 
leges. Germany was dangerous by reason of her numbers, 
and sometimes her culture; but Bohemia was able to resist 
because she knew how to use her forces, and because she 
had a culture of her own, which was not inferior to the 
German. Yet it must be conceded that the Bohemian Court 



IN THE EUROPEAN CRISIS. 35 

and aristocracy adopted German customs and even the Ger- 
man language. 

2. From the fourteenth century Bohemia has really 
played a decisive role in European history; from her came 
the great reforming movement which has stirred up the 
world. The period during which the new Luxemburg dy- 
nasty linked Bohemia to the Empire and the French West 
coincided with a Czech literary revival which repudiated 
the influx of unwonted luxury and refinement, and was 
brought home to the masses of the nation by able preachers. 
The University of Prague, founded by Charles IV. in 1349, 
became the centre of culture for Bohemia and her neigh- 
bours. John Hus and his noble friend, Jerome of Prague, 
became the great torchbearers of the Reformation. Their 
death inflamed the whole Bohemian nation against Rome 
and the treacherous Emperor Sigismund. 

The Hussite Reformation of Bohemia was the inaugura- 
tion of modern spiritual life. Hus opposed the individual 
conscience and the Bible to the authority of the Church 
and of Rom^e, and thus became the forerunner of the Refor- 
mation : but his true significance lies in his moral teaching 
and death. There were many heretics before Hus ; but 
Hus involved the whole Bohemian nation in his heresy, and 
as Rome, making use of Germany, tried to crush Bohemia 
by means of crusades, the Hussite war is a landmark in 
European thought. Bohemia held not only Germany but 
the whole of Europe at bay, and Ziska, the leader of the 
victorious Hussites, became the inventor of modern strat- 
egy. 

The Hussite Reformation was essentially one of life and 
of morals. The Hussites became anti-clerical ; and even 
today clericalism in Bohemia is considered the enemy of 
true religion. Being conservative in its theological teach- 
ing and radical in its moral endeavor, Hussitism soon 
became radical in its teaching also. The Taborites had al- 



36 THE PROBLEM OF SMALI. NATIONS 

ready rejected all Roman teaching and ceremonial; they 
even accepted women as preachers, and in their zeal for 
Christian equality they adopted communism as practised in 
the Apostolic Church. Tlussitism reached its height in the 
Unitas Fratrum — the Church of Bohemian (Moravian) 
Brethren, the remnants of which are the English and Aus- 
trian churches of the Brethren, and the German Herren- 
hut Church. Their founder was Peter Chelcicky, who in- 
terpreted Christian love in its radical form of non-resis- 
tance, and thus fully anticipated Tolstoy's famous doctrine. 
Chelcicky rejected both "whalef" — the Pope and the Em- 
peror — Church and State alike, the whole theocracy and its 
clerical and official organization. His followers in the next 
generation were obliged to modify his teaching; amid the 
horrors of the war against Bohemia they doubtless con- 
founded legitimate defence with force and aggression, for- 
getting that Christ brought not only peace but also a sword 
to defend truth nnd justice against aggression. But hu- 
manitarian endeavour remained the lasting foundation of 
this Church, which historians praise as the truest realiza- 
tion of Christ's teaching. Amos Corneiru , the great hu- 
manitarian teacher of ihe nations, became its last bishop, 
before it was crushed by the Austrian Counter-Reforma- 
tion. 

The Bohemian Reformation, as Palacky rightly observes, 
contains the germ of all modern teaching and institutions; 
it was an anticipation of the future, an ideal to be reached 
by future ages. But Europe did not understand Bohemia, 
and united, under the leadership of Pope and Emperor, to 
crush the nation which had dared to follow its own path. 

Historians differ as to the origin and development of the 
Hussite Reformation, Some Russian and Czech writers 
see in it a revival of the Slav Church of Cyril and Me- 
thodius ; others point to the great influence of Wycliffe and 
the West; while the Germans treat it as a national anti- 
German movement. This last explanation is quite wrong. 



IN THE EUROPEAN CRISIS. 37 

Hus himself declared more than once, that he preferred a 
German who was right to a Bohemian who was wrong. 
Hussitism is the practical, political and social embodiment 
of John Hus's command: "Seek the trudi, hear the truth, 
learn tlie truth, love the truth, speak the truth, hold to the 
truth, defend the truth even to death." 

This deep moral reformation brought the Bohemians to 
love their nation, and to defend it against German aggres- 
sion led by the Church ; it thus became a barrier to the Ger- 
man Drang nach Osten, though it was not so much national 
as moral and religious. 

Hussitism, chiefly in the form of the Brethren's move- 
ment, spread to Slovakia and to Poland, and had a great 
moral influence even on the Germans. Euther himself, as 
is well known, confessed: "We are all Hussites." On the 
other hand, the later Reformation of Switzerland, France* 
and Germany exercised a great influence over the H assites, 
who to a great extent accepted Protestantism. Only about 
one-tenth of the nation remained in the Roman Catholic 
Church — principally the higher aristocracy. 

3. The Hussite wars in the end weakened Bohemia. At 
the same time tlie Turkish menace against Central Europe 
induced Hungary, Austria and Bohemia to unite in a free 
federation (1526.) At flrst, all three States remained en- 
tirely independent, linked only by personal or rather dynas- 
tic ties. Nevertheless their common King had behind him 
the power of the Empire and the resources of Spain, and 
thus gradually succeeded in his centralizing and German- 
ising designs. At first there was only a common imperial 
committee for foreign affairs, but the army also promoted 
unification, and the common finances worked in the same di- 
rection. 

Bohemia was from the very beginning the economic back- 
bone of this strange confederation ; almost the whole of 
Hungarv fell under Turkish dominion, and thus remained 



38 THE PROBL^EM OF SMAI.I. NATIONS 

economically weak and undeveloped. Austria proper was 
barely self-supporting, while Trieste and the Adriatic at 
that time were hardly utilized at all. 

The centralizing absolutism of the Habsburgs and their 
Counter-Reformation caused the Revolution of 1618, which 
ended two years later in the disastrous battle of the White 
Mountain. Ferdinand II. avenged himself by ordering the 
execution of the leaders, whose heads for years frowned 
upon the population of Prague from the tower of the fam- 
ous bridge of Charles IV. Ferdinand, acting on Jesuit ad- 
vice, made use of the occasion to persecute the Protestants, 
and especially the Bohemian Union of Brethren ; about 30,- 
000 families had to leave tlie country, amongst them Com- 
enius! Not only were the Bohemian countries depopu- 
lated, but the Habsburgs carried through one of the great- 
est economic revolutions in history. Four-fifths of the soil 
were taken from the legitimate owners to fill the treasury 
of the greedy Emperor and his tools, drawn from the dregs 
of every aristocracy in Europe. The country was brought 
back to Catholicism by fire and sword — her best men were 
exiled, her literature burned, her lands plundered. 

In 1627, Ferdinand II. curtailed the legislative and ad- 
ministrative rights of tlie nation — but he did not dare to 
deprive Bohemia of her independence. In the same year 
he issued a new charter confirming the privileges of Bo- 
hemia, and expressedly rejecting the theory, preached by 
his advisers and upheld in modern times by Austrian and 
German historians, that the Bohemian nation had forfeited 
its rights to independence. Ferdinand himself and his suc- 
cessors were only too glad to remain kings of Bohemia. 

The power of the Habsburgs was strengthened by tlieir 
success in reimposing Catholicism. The Reformation, while 
destroying the mediaeval theocracy, strengthened the State, 
and, in Catholic countries, the State gained by its alliance 
with the Counter-Reformation. 

During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the 



' IN THE EUROPEAN CRISIS. 39 

Habsburgs continued the unification and centralization of 
Austria proper, Bohemia and Hungary, and this aim seemed 
to have been attained under Maria Theresa and Joseph II. 
But the latter's radical and Germanising methods provoked 
opposition alike in Bohemia, Hungary and all the non-Ger- 
man provinces, and since his days history tells of the revival 
of the Austrian nations. 

4. The opposition of the Bohemian aristocracy to Joseph 
II. was only the political side of a national revival. The 
vk^hole of Europe awakened in the eighteenth century; it 
was the period of humanitarianism in philosophy and litera- 
ture, the age of reason and free thought, the age of Rous- 
seau, Kant and Paine. Absolutism could not oppose such 
a movement indefinitely, and even the absolutist monarchs 
of Austria, Prussia and Russia — Joseph, Frederick, and 
Catherine II. — paid their tribute to the age, and became 
"enlightened" despots. It was this European movement 
which worked for the revival of the Bohemian nation ; for 
the principles of humanitarian philosophy and of the French 
Revolution, the principles of "Liberte — Egalite — Frater- 
nite" were the natural outcome and continuation of the 
Bohemian Reformation and Chelcicky's religion of Fra- 
ternity. The suppression of the Jesuits sanctioned by the 
Pope himself, clearly showed the character of the general 
upheaval of thinking Europe. 

Joseph II.'s Toleration Edict (1781) did not extend to 
the Hussites and the Brethren, who, therefore, had to join 
either the Lutheran or Calvinist Churches; but even this 
restricted freedom strengthened Hussite memories and pro- 
moted the national revival. Everywhere the masses were 
acquiring political rights, the courts and aristocracies were 
no longer able to keep the peoples in political and spiritual 
serfdom; democracy was born, and with it nationality be- 
came a political factor. It was the great humanitarian Her- 



40 THE PROBLEM OF SMALL NATIONS 

der who proclaimed the nations, in opposition to the arti- 
ficial State, as the natural organs of humanity. 

The French Revolution put an end to "enlightened" des- 
potism, and in every country an unenlightened reaction set 
it. In Austria Francis I. was led by Metternich, whose 
system is, for Western Europe, the very embodiment of 
reaction — the continuation of the Habsburg and Jesuit 
Counter-Reformation with all its spiritual horrors. "Spirit 
murderer" it has been called by the greatest German poet 
of Austria. 

The Emperor Francis, absolutist and legitimist to the 
core, was convinced that the time was ripe for transforming 
Austria, Bohemia and Hungary into a united and central- 
ized State. In 1804 the Austrian Empire was proclaimed ; 
in 1806 the new Austrian Emperor resigned the crown of 
the Holy Roman Empire. Yet this resignation was only 
formal, and when, at the ^Vienna Congress, the German 
Confederation was created, the Emperor of Austria was 
proclaimed its head. Indeed, the Pope and England urged 
him to resume the abandoned dignity. 

5. The Meternich regime was not able to suppress that 
literary, revival of tlie Bohemian nation which was the fore- 
runner of the political revival of 1848. Dobrovsky, the 
founder of Slavistic studies — the science and philosophy of 
the Slavs — threw a bridge from the Golden Age of the Re- 
formation across the dark epoch of the Habsburg Counter- 
Reformation to the Age of Reason and Humanity ; he was 
the first among the Czech "awakeners" who guided his na- 
tion towards Russia, and rekindled those Slav sentiments 
which have characterized Bohemia ever since. Patriot and 
Slav — that was the general national programme. 

After Dobrovsky, Kollar, the true disciple of Herder, 
conceived a fascinating philosophy of history ; the Teutonic 
and Latin nations, he argued, having accomplished their 
historical task, will be followed by the Slavs. To strengthen 



IN THE EUROPEAN CRISIS. 41 

the Slavs not only geographically but culturally, he demand- 
ed that every Slav, in the cause of "reciprocity," should 
learn at least one Slav language besides his own. Mean- 
while Safarik, the well-known archaeologist, revived Slav 
antiquity and history, Palacky wrote the first scientific his- 
tory of his nation, and dwelt more especially upon the uni- 
versal meaning of the Bohemian Reformation. 

The remarkable character of the Czech national revival 
is shown by the philosophic and religious attitude of its 
leaders. Dobrovsky, the follower of Josephinism, though 
a Catholic priest and even a Jesuit, became a free thinker ; 
Kollar and Palacky were both Protestants — the first a fol- 
lower of Herder, the latter of Kant; Jungmann, the great 
philologist, was a Voltairian, Kollar and Safarik were Slo- 
vaks ; Slovakia, having received the Hussite emigrants and 
adopted the Hussite Reformation, became the natural sup- 
porter of the Bohemian revival. 

In sympathy with the general European movement the • 
Bohemian nation passed in 1848 from national literature to 
national politics. The revolution of Paris broke out on 21 
February. On the 29th the news reached Prague; and 
on II March the first popular meeting was held, after two 
centuries of political extinction, and formulated the national 
demands. 

As early as 1812 the Bohemian Diet, then a close aristo- 
cratic body, demanded the reslitntion of the rights of the 
kingdom of Bohemia, though of course in vain. But the 
rising in 1848 had the desired effect. On 8 April the Em- 
peror, as King of Bohemia, issued the "Bohemian Char- 
ter," according national rights and promising future po- 
litical independence.^ But the constitutional innovations 
of 1848 proved but a very brief interlude; the revolution 
was suppressed alike in Vienna, Prague and Budapest. Ab- 
solutism, Centralism and Germanisation resumed their 
sway. Meanwhile Ferdinand was superseded by Francis 
Joseph, whose long and sinister regime had already been 



42 THE PROBLEM OF SMALL NATIONS 

outlined in The New Europe (No. 7). The only lasting 
result of the revolution was the liberation of the peasants; 
otherwise Francis Joseph returned to the old system. Only 
the name of Bach replaced the name of Metternich. The 
true spirit of this reaction was revealed in the Concordat 
with Rome. Austria was and is the land of the Counter- 
Reformation. 

But defeat on the battlefields of Italy in 1859 taught 
Francis Joseph at last that absolutism, even on a military 
basis, was impotc'nt and dangerous. The following year 
(i860) an advisory state council was summoned, and on 
20 October the new constitution — the so-called "October 
Diploma" — was proclaimed as the "permanent and irrevoc- 
able constitutional fundamental law of the Empire." But 
already, in February, 1861, this "permanent and irrevocable 
law" was superseded by a new centralist constitution, and 
as this was firmly opposed by the Czechs and all the non- 
German nations of Austria, absolutism was restored in 1865, 
this time in a slightly veiled form. At last, in 1867, yet 
another constitution was established in Austria, but both 
it and Parliament have, by their inherent conditions, proved 
to be far rather the helpmate of absolutism than a demo- 
cratic check upon it. Austria up to the present day has 
really been ruled by the medieval theocracy. For a brief 
moment in 1848 the Parliament of Kremsier laid down the 
fundamental law, "All power proceeds from the people," 
and the Czech leader Dr. Rieger expounded this theme in 
one of his best speeches. But ever since this short-lived 
child of the revolution was dismissed and its home' occu- 
pied by Austrian soldiers each successive constitution in 
Austria has been not a democratic achievement, but the per- 
sonal gift of Francis Joseph, designed as a cloak for theo- 
cratic monarchism, which claims to possess superhuman 
and divine rights. 

6. The year 1866 wrought a great change ; the Hab;-- 



IN THE EUROPEAN CRISIS. 43 

burgs were turned out of Germany, the HohcnzoHcrns be- 
came the leaders of Germany. The national craving of all 
Germans for unity now became a practical reality ; Prussia, 
who had prepared for it by her military and economic policy 
finally achieved it in 187 1 through the defeat of France. 
It would have been natural that Austria, after 1866, should 
have sought and found her strength in the development and 
unity of her various nations; but the Habbburgs were un- 
able to give up their absolutist and imperialist leanings. 

In 1866 the Prussian invaders of Bohemia published a 
proclamation acknowledging her right to full national inde- 
pendence, just as they recognized the same right to Hun- 
gary. But the Czechs turned a deaf ear and continued in 
their democratic and national endeavours of 1848; their pol- 
iticians worked in the common Parliament and in the Diets 
for the federalization of the Empire, and in this they were 
supported by the non-German nations, the Germans being 
the protectors of centralism. But the dynasty came to an 
agreement with the Magyars, and the Dual system was de- 
signed to assure the hegemony of the Germans in Austria 
and of the Mag}'ais in Plungary. 

The Czech leaders, with Palacky, the "Father of the 
Nation," at their head, answered the illogical transformation 
of Austria into "Austria-Hungary" by paying an official 
visit to the ethnographic exhibition in Moscow in 1867, and 
thus proclaiming a radical national and Slav policy. Next 
year at the Diet the Czech deputies issued their famous 
Declaration, re-stating the historic rights of Bohemia. 

Vienna answered by a fierce persecution. The common 
law was suspended and martial law introduced and admin- 
istered by a General specially selected by Francis Joseph 
himself. But all the ferocity and cruelty employed did not 
crush the resistance of the leaders and the people. The 
Emperor had lo yield, and he did so by appointing a new 
ministry presided over by Count Hohenwart, to conclude an 
agreement with the Bohemian nation. In a solemn rescript 



44 THE PROBLEM OF SMALL NATIONS 

to the Bohemian Diet (12 September, 1871) Francis Joseph 
acknowledged the rights of Bohemia and promised to be 
crowned as its King. 

Promises have ever been cheap with Francis Joseph. The 
Czechs formulated their wishes in a draft constitution — 
the Fundamental Articles of 10 October, 1871 — but in less 
than a month the influence of Berlin and Budapest suc- 
ceeded in getting rid of Count Hohenwart and his minis- 
try, and in replacing it by one selected for the special pur- 
pose of breaking Bohemian opposition. Never in the nine- 
teenth century, in any civilized and constitutional country 
save Hungary, has a government, acting for the sovereign 
himself, behaved so shamelessly. An electoral caucus was 
organized to control the elections to the Diet and the Cen- 
tral Parliament; votes were openly bought and sold; meet- 
ings were suppressed by force; and the Czech papers and 
their editors persecuted. The gendarmerie and troops did 
not shrink from bloodshed. Corruption was rampant every- 
where. In all departments of the administration the na- 
tional life was checked and Germanization openly pro- 
claimed. Vexations of all kinds, even in trifling matters, 
were the rule. I remember how the national songs were 
forbidden and the national emblems prohibited. Czech tel- 
egrams were not accepted, and we composed French words 
giving a meaning in our language. Vienna succeeded so 
far that a group of Moravian deputies gave up their policy 
of passive resistance, which had culminated in abstention 
from the Central Parliament and even from the Diets, and 
in refusal to pay the taxes. Finally the Premier, Count 
Taaffe, the descendant of an Irish family, agreed in 1879 
to make some concessions if all the Czech deputies would 
take their seats in the Central Parliament. At the begin- 
ning of his speech from the Throne the Emperor acknow- 
ledged tlieir "full right of constitutional conviction." Cer- 
tain administrative rights were granted, and the long- 
fought- for Czech University was established ; on the whole 



IN THE EUROPEAN CRISIS. 45 

a practical modus vivendi was introduced, the achievement 
of our political rights being hoped for by the new method 
of compromises. 

7. The establishment of the HohenzoUern Empire and 
the growth of national chauvinism in Germany led the Ger- 
mans of Austria to make common cause with their kinsmen 
in Germany, and Francis Joseph yielded to their pressure. 
Pangermanism became a popular programme among the 
union of Austria and even Hungary with Germany. The 
"lyon von Rom" movement of the new century was noth- 
ing else than 'Xos Von Oesterreich" or "Los Von Habs- 
burg,.' Bismarck, strong in his authority as the founder of 
united Germany, resisted the Pangerman extremists. His 
plan was to leave Austria-Hungary independent, but to use 
her for Germany and her programme. In reality, he heartily 
despised Austria, for he saw through her. 

But Bismarck's plans were not original. They were mere- 
ly the continuation of older ideas and aims ; it is only half 
true to say that he pushed Austria-Hungary towards the 
Balkans and the East. Austria was from the first the east- 
ern kingdom (Ostreich, Oesterreich) and has fostered plans 
of conquest ever since the days of Prince Eugene. The 
weakening of Turkey suggested this to the neighbouring 
victorious Empire. It was not only Bismarck who induced 
Austria-Hungary to occupy Bosnia-Herzegovina ; Radetzky 
and Cardinal Rauscher of Vienna formulated this pro- 
gramme long before Bismark. In the same way, when in 
1848, at Frankfurt, the German nationalists were offering 
the German crown to the Hohenzollerns, Austria answered 
by the imperialistic programme of Prince Schwarzenberg 
and of Baron Bruck, who, following Friedrich List, devised 
the programme of Central Europe as it is now preached in 
Germany and Austria. 

Bismack, it is true, gained Andrassy and the Magyars 
for his plans ; but it was Dualism which unchained Magyar 
imperiaUsm. Bismark was clever enough to use it as a 



46 THE PROBLEM OF SAIAEL NATIONS 

means of putting pressure on Vienna, which could not 
easily forgot 1866. But long before Bismark List had 
preached in Germany a very practical Pangerman Mag- 
yarophilism. 

The occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina led Austria into 
a fatal antagonism against not only the Southern Slavs but 
also Russia. Germany joined her in this direction. Bis- 
marck hoped, in spite of the Berlin Congress, not to lose 
the friendship of Russia, and even the creation of the Triple 
Alliance did not prevent him from the effort to secure the 
re-insurance of Russia, or rather, of Petrograd. But the 
new generation in Germany conceived Pangermanism in the 
sense of "Berlhi -Bagdad," and the road to Bagdad led to 
an inevitable dispute with Russia about Constantinople. 
William H., accepting Lagarde's teaching, and the designs 
of world-power which it involved, dismissed Bismarck and 
placed himself at the head of the new generation. Austria- 
Hungary and Prussia-Germany inaugurated a very decided 
anti-Slav policy with the double object of crushing the 
Czechs in the North, and the Jugoslavs, and above all the 
Serbs, in the South. 

The Germans used the unjust privileges conferred by an 
artificial constitution to maintain a majority in the Parlia- 
ment and in the Diets ; the bureaucracy and army rflso served 
their aims. The so-called Einz programme, and, still more, 
the motion brought forward by the Pangermap leader, 
Schonerer, in 1901, aimed at granting a kind of autonomy 
to Galicia, Bukovina and even to Dalmatia, with the object 
of securing to the Germans a strong and unshakable ma- 
jority. Count Badeni induced the Emperor to restore to 
Bohemia a part of her national right, but again the Emperior 
gave in to German terrorism and Badeni's decree was step 
by step abolished. 

The Poles were partly satisfied (Galician Resolution 
1868), but Vienna temporarily favoured the Ruthenes not 
only against Russia but also against the Poles ; the South- 



IN THE EUROPEAN CRISIS. 47 

ern Slavs were utterly neglected, and though in Dalmatia 
the Croat language was introduced into the administration, 
this was done not to satisfy the Slav majority, but simply 
to annoy the Italian minority. Trieste was invaded by 
Viennese and Berlin capital — Trieste, which not less than 
Prague, is coveted by the Pangermans as the starting-point 
for Suez and the East. The anti-Slav policy of the Magyars 
is too notorious to require special treatment here. King 
Milan's policy is an illustration of how the Austrians are 
willing to extend toleration to the Balkan Slavs, when they 
accept thraldom. 

This anti-Slav policy culminated, after the annexation of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, in unreasoning hostility to Serbia, and 
the present war is its logical outcome — the continuation of 
the policy inaugurated by the mediaeval Empire, 

Though essentially anti-Slav, the Pangermanism of Ger- 
many and Austria Hungary threatens the Western nations 
in Africa and Asia, and has welded together Slavs, Latins, 
and British. In this vast struggle the place of the Czecho- 
slovaks can only be on the side of the Slavs and of the 
Western nations; not only their geographical position, but 
their whole historical development and national programme 
forces them to join those who have proclaimed as their aim 
the respect for nationalities and liberation of all nations, 
great and small, the crushing of Prussian militarism, and 
consequently the inner regeneration of Europe as a whole. 
The national ideals of Bohemia and her Reformation are 
unrealisable in Austria-Hungary, where the organisation of 
Brute Force secures to the minority the means of exploiting 
the majority. Boliemia can never accept the ideal of Prussia 
and Germany, which would enslave the world by military 
drill and Machiavellian misuse of science and culture. The 
German is a strange mixture of the schoolmaster and the 
bully; he first knocks his opponent down and then gives 
him a lecture and a sermon. 



48 THE PROBLEM OF SMAEE NATIONS 

8. The fight for Right has been waged by the Czechs ever 
since they settled in Central Europe. For centuries they had 
to hold their own against Germany, Habsburg Austria and 
the Magyars ; and, since Dualism was established, they have 
had to face Austria and Hungary united with Prussia- 
Germany. Bohemia has not been conquered by Austria — 
she joined Austria and Hungary as par inter pares; she is 
legally just as independent a State as Hungary, and by the 
same right. This right has been violated by the dynasty; 
the personal union has been changed via facti Into a real 
union. But law and justice rannot be nfiPected by material 
force or so-called historical necessities. Bohemia has been 
struggling against Austria-Hungary since 1867, and with 
the same right she continues her fight in this war. The 
Habsburgs have forfeited their rights in regard to Bohemia 
by their repeated and almost continuous treachery. Not the 
Czechs alone, but no nation can trust or accept Austro- 
Hungarian policy, for it is the policy of a single family, 
and only the advocates of mediaeval theocracy and abso- 
lutism can prefer the rights of one family to the rights of 
ten nations. The Prussian Germans, the Turks and Austria's 
royal agent in Bulgaria accept the Habsburgs, because they 
pursue the same antiquated dynastic aims; but if Europe 
is to be regenerated this immoral and obsolete tradition 
be finally overcome. The Allies, if we may judge from their 
answer to President Wilson, understand this.. The great 
question is how their aims can be realised. There is only 
one way: victory on the battlefield can alone secure the 
victory of truth and humanity. Truth atid humanity in the 
abstract are not victorious, if men and nations do not de- 
fend and protect them. 

Thomas G. Masaryk. 



WHY 




4TS PEACE NOW 



THE PANGERMAN PLAN 

as realised by War 
IN EUROPE AND IN ASIA 



m 
►J^ 



"Central Europe" and itS'Annex.e in the Near .East 

(Germany, Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria. Tttrbey) 
The Entente Powers. 
Territory occupied by Central Powers 
Territory occupied by Entente Powers 
GERMANY'S MAIN ROUTE TO THE EAST 

(Berlin-Bagdad, Beriin-Hodeida, Berlin-Cairo-Cape) 

Supplementary Routes 
( Berlin-Trieste. Berlin-Salonica-Athens, Berlin-Constantza-Constantmople) 

Uncompleted sectors ^_^_____«___^_______^ 




.,c KusTA & Mejdrich. Printers, 
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